Friday, April 06, 2007

British sailors say Iran threatened them | Reuters

British sailors say Iran threatened them | Reuters

British sailors say Iran threatened them
Fri Apr 6, 2007 5:33PM EDT

By Luke MacGregor

CHIVENOR (Reuters) - The 15 British sailors and marines seized by Iran in the Gulf last month said on Friday they were blindfolded, bound, kept in isolation and warned that they faced up to seven years in jail.

"Throughout our ordeal, we faced constant psychological pressure," they said in a joint statement at a news conference.

Iran said they were detained for entering its waters illegally but Britain said they were in Iraqi waters.

"We were interrogated most nights and given two options. If we admitted that we had strayed, we would be back on a plane to the UK pretty soon. If we didn't, we faced up to seven years in prison," the statement said.

Iran said Friday's news conference was "theatrical propaganda" to cover up their illegal entry into its waters.

Before being freed, Iranian TV showed some of the 15 saying they had entered Iranian territory and had been well treated.

But on Friday the 15 said they heard weapons being cocked behind them after their capture and feared the worst.

The sole woman, Faye Turney, was kept isolated for several days and told by her captors that the others had been sent home.

Iran freed the sailors and marines on Thursday after a 13-day stand-off and they flew home to an emotional reunion with their families.

Their description of captivity was in sharp contrast to the images of them smiling on Iranian television which they now say were an Iranian "media stunt".

Tehran said the same about Friday's news conference.

"Such staged moves cannot cover up the mistake made by British military personnel who illegally entered Iran's territory," said a Foreign Ministry statement. "Such theatrical propaganda can not justify the soldiers' mistake."

STONE CELLS

The sailors said that after their arrest in the Gulf, they were taken to a prison in Tehran.

"We were blindfolded, our hands were bound, we were forced up against a wall," they said.

They were "stripped and dressed in pyjamas ... we were kept in stone cells, approximately eight feet by six, sleeping on piles of blankets. All of us were kept in isolation."

They said they had been arrested in Iraqi waters.

"Had we resisted, there would have been a major fight, one which we could not have won, and with consequences that would have a major strategic impact," said Captain Chris Air.

"We were 1.7 nautical miles from Iranian waters," Lieutenant Felix Carman told the news conference.

Britain has suspended boarding operations in the Gulf and is reviewing rules of engagement in the area's waters amid disquiet over how easily the sailors were seized on March 23.

"As part of this ongoing review, the operational procedures and the rules of engagement that go with them will be reconsidered," navy chief Admiral Jonathon Band told BBC Radio.

(Additional reporting by Parisa Hafezi in Tehran)

Ethiopia, under pressure for details on detainees in secret jails

eitb24
The detainees include at least one U.S. citizen and some are from Canada, Sweden and France. They also include citizens from Eritrea, Saudi Arabia, Tanzania, Rwanda, Tunisia and Morocco.

Ethiopia was under pressure to release details of detainees from 19 countries held at secret prisons in the country, where U.S. agents have carried out interrogations in the hunt for al-Qaida in the Horn of Africa.

Canada, Eritrea and Sweden were lobbying Thursday for information about their citizens in Ethiopia, where human rights groups say hundreds of prisoners, including women and children, have been transferred secretly and illegally. An investigation by The Associated Press found that CIA and FBI agents have been interrogating the detainees.

Officials from Ethiopia, which has a troubling human rights record, were not immediately available for comment, but in the past have refused to acknowledge the existence of the prisons.

Canadian Foreign Affairs spokesman said of Canadian citizen Bashir Makhtal: "We know that he is in Ethiopia." "We've been making, and continue to make, representations both here in Ottawa and in Ethiopia to get access to him," Beaulieu said.

Some detainees were swept up by Ethiopian troops that drove a radical Islamist government out of neighboring Somalia late last year, according to Kenyan officials and police. Others have been deported from Kenya, where many Somalis have fled the continuing violence in their homeland, they said.

The detainees include at least one U.S. citizen and some are from Canada, Sweden and France, according to a list compiled by a Kenyan Muslim rights group and flight manifests obtained by AP. They also include citizens from Eritrea, Saudi Arabia, Tanzania, Rwanda, Tunisia and Morocco.

WP: Saddam's ties to al-Qaida discounted - washingtonpost.com Highlights - MSNBC.com

WP: Saddam's ties to al-Qaida discounted - washingtonpost.com Highlights - MSNBC.com

WP: Saddam's ties to al-Qaida discounted
Declassified Pentagon report says contacts were limited
By R. Jeffrey Smith
The Washington Post
Updated: 7:19 a.m. ET April 6, 2007

Captured Iraqi documents and intelligence interrogations of Saddam Hussein and two former aides "all confirmed" that Hussein's regime was not directly cooperating with al-Qaeda before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, according to a declassified Defense Department report released yesterday.

The declassified version of the report, by acting Inspector General Thomas F. Gimble, also contains new details about the intelligence community's prewar consensus that the Iraqi government and al-Qaeda figures had only limited contacts, and its judgments that reports of deeper links were based on dubious or unconfirmed information. The report had been released in summary form in February.

The report's release came on the same day that Vice President Cheney, appearing on Rush Limbaugh's radio program, repeated his allegation that al-Qaeda was operating inside Iraq "before we ever launched" the war, under the direction of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the terrorist killed last June.

"This is al-Qaeda operating in Iraq," Cheney told Limbaugh's listeners about Zarqawi, who he said had "led the charge for Iraq." Cheney cited the alleged history to illustrate his argument that withdrawing U.S. forces from Iraq would "play right into the hands of al-Qaeda."

Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl M. Levin (D-Mich.), who requested the report's declassification, said in a written statement that the complete text demonstrates more fully why the inspector general concluded that a key Pentagon office -- run by former undersecretary of defense Douglas J. Feith -- had inappropriately written intelligence assessments before the March 2003 invasion alleging connections between al-Qaeda and Iraq that the U.S. intelligence consensus disputed.

‘Mature’ relationship?
The report, in a passage previously marked secret, said Feith's office had asserted in a briefing given to Cheney's chief of staff in September 2002 that the relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda was "mature" and "symbiotic," marked by shared interests and evidenced by cooperation across 10 categories, including training, financing and logistics.

Instead, the report said, the CIA had concluded in June 2002 that there were few substantiated contacts between al-Qaeda operatives and Iraqi officials, and said that it lacked evidence of a long-term relationship like the one Iraq had forged with other terrorist groups.

"Overall, the reporting provides no conclusive signs of cooperation on specific terrorist operations," that CIA report said, adding that discussions on the issue were "necessarily speculative."

The CIA had separately concluded that reports of Iraqi training on weapons of mass destruction were "episodic, sketchy, or not corroborated in other channels," the inspector general's report said. It quoted an August 2002 CIA report describing the relationship as more closely resembling "two organizations trying to feel out or exploit each other" rather than cooperating operationally.

The CIA was not alone, the defense report emphasized. The Defense Intelligence Agency had concluded that year that "available reporting is not firm enough to demonstrate an ongoing relationship" between the Iraqi regime and al-Qaeda, it said.

But the contrary conclusions reached by Feith's office -- and leaked to the conservative Weekly Standard magazine before the war -- were publicly praised by Cheney as the best source of information on the topic, a circumstance the Pentagon report cites in documenting the impact of what it described as "inappropriate" work.

52-page rebuttal
Feith has vigorously defended his work, accusing Gimble of "giving bad advice based on incomplete fact-finding and poor logic," and charging that the acting inspector general has been "cheered on by the chairmen of the Senate intelligence and armed services committees." In January, Feith's successor at the Pentagon, Eric S. Edelman, wrote a 52-page rebuttal to the inspector general's report that disputed its analysis and recommendations for Pentagon reform.

Cheney's public statements before and after the war about the risks posed by Iraq have closely tracked the briefing Feith's office presented to the vice president's then-chief of staff, I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby. That includes the briefing's depiction of an alleged 2001 meeting in Prague between an Iraqi intelligence official and one of the Sept. 11, 2001, hijackers as one of eight "Known Iraq-Al Qaida Contacts."

The defense report states that at the time, "the intelligence community disagreed with the briefing's assessment that the alleged meeting constituted a 'known contact' " -- a circumstance the report said was known to Feith's office. But his office had bluntly concluded in a July 2002 critique of a CIA report on Iraq's relationship with al-Qaeda that the CIA's interpretation of the facts it cited "ought to be ignored."

The briefing to Libby was also presented with slight variations to then-Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, then-CIA Director George J. Tenet and then-deputy national security adviser Stephen Hadley. It was prepared in part by what the defense report described as a "junior Naval Reservist" intelligence analyst detailed to Feith's office from the DIA. The person is not named in the report, but Edelman wrote that she was requested by Feith's office.

When a senior intelligence analyst working for the government's counterterrorism task force obtained an early account of the conclusions by Feith's office -- titled "Iraq and al-Qaida: Making the Case" -- the analyst prepared a detailed rebuttal calling it of "no intelligence value" and taking issue with 15 of 26 key conclusions, the report states. The analyst's rebuttal was shared with intelligence officers on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but evidently not with others.

Edelman complained in his own account of the incident that a senior Joint Chiefs analyst -- in responding to a suggestion by the DIA analyst that the "Making the Case" account be widely circulated -- told its author that "putting it out there would be playing into the hands of people" such as then-Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz, and belittled the author for trying to support "some agenda of people in the building."

But the inspector general's report, in a footnote, commented that it was "noteworthy . . . that post-war debriefs of Sadaam Hussein, [former Iraqi foreign minister] Tariq Aziz, [former Iraqi intelligence minister Mani al-Rashid] al Tikriti, and [senior al-Qaeda operative Ibn al-Shaykh] al-Libi, as well as document exploitation by DIA all confirmed that the Intelligence Community was correct: Iraq and al-Qaida did not cooperate in all categories" alleged by Feith's office.

‘No conclusive signs’
From these sources, the report added, "the terms the Intelligence Community used to describe the relationship between Iraq and al-Qaida were validated, [namely] 'no conclusive signs,' and 'direct cooperation . . . has not been established.' "

Zarqawi, whom Cheney depicted yesterday as an agent of al-Qaeda in Iraq before the war, was not then an al-Qaeda member but was the leader of an unaffiliated terrorist group who occasionally associated with al-Qaeda adherents, according to several intelligence analysts. He publicly allied himself with al-Qaeda after the U.S. invasion, in early 2004.

Staff writer Dafna Linzer and staff researcher Julie Tate contributed to this report.
© 2007 The Washington Post Company

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