Ray McGovern
        Consortium News
        Sunday January 13, 2008
                 When the Tonkin Gulf incident took place in early August 1964, I was            a journeyman CIA analyst in what Condoleezza Rice refers to as “the            bowels of the agency.”
         As a current intelligence analyst responsible for Russian policy toward            Southeast Asia and China, I worked very closely with those responsible            for analysis of Vietnam and China.
         Out of that experience I must say that, as much as one might be tempted            to laugh at the bizarre theatrical accounts of Sunday’s incident            involving small Iranian boats and U.S. naval ships in the Strait of            Hormuz, this is—as my old Russian professor used to insist—nothing            to laugh.
         The situation is so reminiscent of what happened—and didn’t            happen—from Aug. 2-4, 1964, in the Gulf of Tonkin and in Washington,            it is in no way funny.
         At the time, the U.S. had about 16,000 troops in South Vietnam. The            war that was “justified” by the Tonkin Gulf resolution of            Aug. 7, 1964, led to a buildup of 535,000 U.S. troops in the late Sixties,            58,000 of whom were killed—not to mention the estimated two million            Vietnamese who lost their lives by then and in the ensuing 10 years.
Ten years. How can our president speak so glibly about 10 more years            of a U.S. armed presence in Iraq? He must not remember Vietnam.
          Lessons From Vietnam and Iraq
         What follows is written primarily for honest intelligence analysts            and managers still on “active duty.”
         The issuance of the recent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on            Iran was particularly welcome to those of us who had been hoping there            were enough of you left who had not been thoroughly corrupted by former            CIA Director George Tenet and his malleable managers.
         We are not so much surprised at the integrity of Tom Fingar, who is            in charge of national intelligence analysis. He showed his mettle in            manfully resisting forgeries and fairy tales about Saddam Hussein’s            “weapons of mass destruction.”
         What is, frankly, a happy surprise is the fact that he and other non-ideologues            and non-careerist professionals have been able to prevail and speak            truth to power on such dicey issues as the Iranian nuclear program,            the upsurge in terrorism caused by the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and the            year-old NIE saying Iraq is headed for hell in a hand basket (with no            hint that a “surge” could make a difference).
         But those are the NIEs. They share the status of “supreme genre”            of analytic product with the President’s Daily Brief and other            vehicles for current intelligence, the field in which I labored, first            in the analytic trenches and then as a briefer at the White House, for            most of my 27-year career.
         True, the NIE “Iraq’s Continuing Program for Weapons of            Mass Destruction” of Oct. 1, 2002, (wrong on every major count)            greased the skids for the attack on Iraq on March 19, 2003. But it is            more often current intelligence that is fixed upon to get the country            into war.
         The Tonkin Gulf events are perhaps the best case in point. We retired            professionals who worked through the Tonkin Gulf incident are hopeful            that Fingar can ensure integrity in the current intelligence process            as well.
         Salivating for a Wider War
         Given the confusion last Sunday in the Persian Gulf, you need to remember            that a “known known” in the form of a non-event has already            been used to sell a major war—Vietnam. It is not only in retrospect            that we know that no attack occurred that night.
         Those of us in intelligence, not to mention President Lyndon Johnson,            Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and National Security Adviser McGeorge            Bundy all knew full well that the evidence of any armed attack on the            evening of Aug. 4, 1964, the so-called “second” Tonkin Gulf            incident, was highly dubious.
         But it fit the president’s purposes, so they lent a hand to facilitate            escalation of the war.
         During the summer of 1964, President Johnson and the Joint Chiefs of            Staff were eager to widen the war in Vietnam. They stepped up sabotage            and hit-and-run attacks on the coast of North Vietnam.
         Defense Secretary Robert McNamara later admitted that he and other            senior leaders had concluded that the seaborne attacks “amounted            to little more than pinpricks” and “were essentially worthless,”            but they continued.
         Concurrently, the National Security Agency was ordered to collect signals            intelligence from the North Vietnamese coast on the Gulf of Tonkin,            and the surprise coastal attacks were seen as a helpful way to get the            North Vietnamese to turn on their coastal radars.
         The destroyer USS Maddox, carrying electronic spying gear, was authorized            to approach as close as eight miles from the coast and four miles from            offshore islands, some of which already had been subjected to intense            shelling by clandestine attack boats.
         As James Bamford describes it in “Body of Secrets:”
         “The twin missions of the Maddox were in a sense symbiotic. The            vessel’s primary purpose was to act as a seagoing provocateur—to            poke its sharp gray bow and the American flag as close to the belly            of North Vietnam as possible, in effect shoving its 5-inch cannons up            the nose of the Communist navy. In turn, this provocation would give            the shore batteries an excuse to turn on as many coastal defense radars,            fire control systems, and communications channels as possible, which            could then be captured by the men...at the radar screens. The more provocation,            the more signals...
         “The Maddox’ mission was made even more provocative by            being timed to coincide with commando raids, creating the impression            that the Maddox was directing those missions and possibly even lobbing            firepower in their support....
         “North Vietnam also claimed at least a twelve-mile limit and            viewed the Maddox as a trespassing ship deep within its territorial            waters.”
          (pp 295-296)
         On Aug. 2, 1964, an intercepted message ordered North Vietnamese torpedo            boats to attack the Maddox. The destroyer was alerted and raced out            to sea beyond reach of the torpedoes, three of which were fired in vain            at the destroyer’s stern.
         The Maddox’s captain suggested that the rest of his mission be            called off, but the Pentagon refused. And still more commando raids            were launched on Aug. 3, shelling for the first time targets on the            mainland, not just the offshore islands.
         Early on Aug. 4, the Maddox captain cabled his superiors that the North            Vietnamese believed his patrol to be directly involved with the commando            raids and shelling. That evening at 7:15 (Vietnam time) the Pentagon            alerted the Maddox to intercepted messages indicating that another attack            by patrol boats was imminent.
         What followed was panic and confusion. There was a score of reports            of torpedo and other hostile attacks, but no damage and growing uncertainty            as to whether any attack actually took place. McNamara was told that            “freak radar echoes” were misinterpreted by “young            fellows” manning the sonar, who were “apt to say any noise            is a torpedo.”
         This did not prevent McNamara from testifying to Congress two days            later that there was “unequivocal proof” of a new attack.            And based largely on that, Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf resolution            bringing 10 more years of war.
         Meanwhile, in the Trenches
         By the afternoon of Aug. 4, the CIA’s expert analyst on North            Vietnam (let’s call him “Tom”) had concluded that            probably no one had fired on the U.S. ships. He included a paragraph            to that effect in the item he wrote for the Current Intelligence Bulletin,            which would be wired to the White House and other key agencies and appear            in print the next morning.
         And then something unique happened. The Director of the Office of Current            Intelligence, a very senior officer whom Tom had never before seen,            descended into the bowels of the agency to order the paragraph deleted.            He explained:
         “We’re not going to tell LBJ that now. He has already decided            to bomb North Vietnam. We have to keep our lines open to the White House.”
         “Tom” later bemoaned—quite rightly: “What do            we need open lines for, if we’re not going to use them, and use            them to tell the truth?”
         Two years ago, I would have been tempted to comment sarcastically,            “How quaint; how obsolete.” But the good news is that the            analysts writing the NIEs have now reverted to the ethos in which “Tom”            and I were proud to work.
         Now the analysts/reporters of current intelligence need to follow suit,            and we hope Tom Fingar can hold their feet to the fire. For if they            don’t measure up, the consequences are sure to be disastrous.
         This should be obvious in the wake of the Tonkin Gulf reporting experience,            not to mention more recent performance of senior officials before the            attack on Iraq in 2003.
         The late Ray S. Cline, who was the current intelligence director’s            boss at the time of the Tonkin Gulf incident, said he was “very            sure” that no attack took place on Aug. 4. He suggested that McNamara            had shown the president unevaluated signals intelligence which referred            to the (real) earlier attack on Aug. 2 rather than the non-event on            the 4th.
         There was no sign of remorse on Cline’s part that he didn’t            step in and make sure the president was told the truth.
         We in the bowels knew there was no attack; and so did the Director            of Current Intelligence as well as Cline, the Deputy Director for Intelligence.            But all knew, as did McNamara, that President Johnson was lusting for            a pretext to strike the North and escalate the war. And, like B’rer            Rabbit, they didn’t say nothin’.
         Commenting on the interface of intelligence and policy on Vietnam,            a senior CIA officer has written about:
         “... the dilemma CIA directors and senior intelligence professionals            face in cases when they know that unvarnished intelligence judgments            will not be welcomed by the President, his policy managers, and his            political advisers...[They] must decide whether to tell it like it is            (and so risk losing their place at the President’s advisory table),            or to go with the flow of existing policy by accentuating the positive            (thus preserving their access and potential influence). In these episodes            from the Vietnam era, we have seen that senior CIA officers more often            than not tended toward the latter approach.”
          “CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes, 1962-1968,”            Harold P. Ford
         Back to Iran. This time, we all know what the president and vice president            are lusting after—an excuse to attack Iran. But there is a big            difference from the situation in the summer of 1964, when President            Johnson had intimidated all his senior subordinates into using deceit            to escalate the war.
         Bamford comments on the disingenuousness of Robert McNamara when he            testified in 1968 that it was “inconceivable” that senior            officials, including the president, deliberately used the Tonkin Gulf            events to generate congressional support for a wider Vietnam War.
         In Bamford’s words, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had become “a            sewer of deceit,” with Operation Northwoods and other unconscionable            escapades to their credit. Then-Under Secretary of State George Ball            commented, “There was a feeling that if the destroyer got into            some trouble, that this would provide the provocation we needed.”
         Good News: It’s Different Now
         It is my view that the only thing that has prevented Bush and Cheney            from attacking Iran so far has been the strong opposition of the uniformed            military, including the Joint Chiefs.
         As the misadventure last Sunday in the Strait of Hormuz shows, our            senior military officers need all the help they can get from intelligence            officers more concerned with the truth than with “keeping lines            open to the White House” and doing its bidding.
         In addition, the intelligence oversight committees in Congress seem            to be waking from their Rip Van Winkle-like slumber. It was Congress,            after all, that ordered the controversial NIE on Iran/nuclear (and insisted            it be publicized).
         And the flow of substantive intelligence to Congress is much larger            than it was in 1964 when, remember, there were no intelligence committees            as such.
         So, you inheritors of the honorable profession of current intelligence            – I’m thinking of you, Rochelle, and you, Rick – don’t            let them grind you down.
         If you’re working in the bowels of the CIA and you find that            your leaders are cooking the intelligence once again into a recipe for            casus belli, think long and hard about your oath to protect the Constitution.            Should that oath not transcend any secrecy promise you had to accept            as a condition of employment?
         By sticking your neck out, you might be able to prevent 10 years of            unnecessary war.